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2026-04-24 08:24:34 +00:00
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@@ -962,6 +962,46 @@ User sees application (authenticated)
---
### Accessing Authenticated User Information
The auth sidecar handles all authentication before requests reach your application. Your app never sees unauthenticated traffic — the sidecar returns 401 or redirects to the IdP first.
After successful authentication, the sidecar forwards the request to your application with user identity injected as HTTP headers:
| Header | Description | Available in |
|--------|-------------|-------------|
| `X-Auth-User` | Username or display name | Token, OIDC, MCP |
| `X-Auth-Email` | User email address | OIDC |
| `X-Auth-Subject` | OIDC `sub` claim (stable user ID) | OIDC, MCP |
| `X-Auth-Groups` | Comma-separated group memberships | OIDC (if scope includes `groups`) |
| `X-Auth-Token` | The validated access token | All modes |
**Your application reads these headers — no auth library needed:**
```javascript
// Express.js example
app.get('/profile', (req, res) => {
const user = req.headers['x-auth-user'];
const email = req.headers['x-auth-email'];
res.json({ user, email });
});
```
```python
# Flask example
@app.route('/profile')
def profile():
user = request.headers.get('X-Auth-User')
email = request.headers.get('X-Auth-Email')
return jsonify(user=user, email=email)
```
**Why this is safe**: The Kyverno-generated NetworkPolicy restricts ingress to the sidecar port only. Traffic cannot bypass the sidecar to reach the application port directly, so the `X-Auth-*` headers can be trusted unconditionally.
**Key principle**: Your application is zero-trust-unaware by design. It reads headers and renders UI. All authentication complexity lives in the sidecar and Kyverno policy.
---
### Authentication Configuration Reference
#### Helm Values Schema

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@@ -631,6 +631,15 @@ retry:
4. 40 seconds
5. 80 seconds (capped at 3 minutes)
### Global Settings (`argocd-cm`)
| Setting | Value | Purpose |
|---------|-------|---------|
| `application.resourceTrackingMethod` | `annotation` | Track resources via annotations |
| `timeout.reconciliation` | `60s` | Reconciliation interval |
| `admin.enabled` | `true` | Enable admin account |
| `git.submodule.enabled` | `false` | Disable git submodule checkout — submodules are not needed for manifest generation |
---
## Infrastructure Components
@@ -1098,6 +1107,33 @@ kubectl get secret keycloak-client-<app> -n keycloak -o jsonpath='{.metadata.ann
**See**: [Developer Guide - Adding a New Keycloak Client](DEVELOPER-GUIDE.md#adding-a-new-keycloak-client)
### Karpor
**Chart**: `karpor` from `https://kusionstack.github.io/charts`
**Version**: 0.7.6 (app v0.6.4)
**Namespace**: `karpor`
**Sync Wave**: 1
**Purpose**: Kubernetes visualization and intelligence tool. Provides cross-cluster resource search, compliance checking, and topology visualization. Gives platform engineers a unified view of all cluster resources and their relationships.
**Architecture** (4 components):
- **Server** — main Karpor API/UI (port 7443)
- **Syncer** — syncs cluster state into the search index
- **ElasticSearch** — search backend for resource indexing
- **etcd** — persistent key-value store (10Gi PVC)
**Configuration** (`infra/values/base/karpor-values.yaml`):
- `namespaceEnabled: false` — ArgoCD manages namespace creation
- Default resource limits tuned for small clusters
- ElasticSearch: 2 CPU / 4Gi memory (the heaviest component)
- AI features available but not enabled (requires `server.ai.authToken` + backend config)
**Access**: Port-forward to reach the UI:
```bash
kubectl port-forward svc/karpor-release-server -n karpor 7443:7443
# Open https://localhost:7443
```
### Renovate
**Chart**: `renovate` (OCI: `ghcr.io/renovatebot/charts`)
@@ -1545,7 +1581,23 @@ Forward to Application (localhost:3000)
Application processes request
```
**See**: [Developer Guide - Enabling Authentication](DEVELOPER-GUIDE.md#enabling-authentication-for-applications) for usage examples.
#### Forwarded Headers
After successful authentication, the sidecar injects user identity as HTTP headers before forwarding the request to the application container:
| Header | Description | Auth Modes |
|--------|-------------|------------|
| `X-Auth-User` | Username or display name | Token, OIDC, MCP |
| `X-Auth-Email` | User email address | OIDC |
| `X-Auth-Subject` | OIDC `sub` claim (stable user ID) | OIDC, MCP |
| `X-Auth-Groups` | Comma-separated group memberships | OIDC (if `groups` scope) |
| `X-Auth-Token` | The validated access token | All modes |
These headers are trustworthy because the auto-generated `NetworkPolicy` restricts pod ingress to the sidecar port only — external traffic cannot reach the application container directly, so headers cannot be spoofed.
Applications should read these headers to obtain authenticated user information (e.g. for display, authorisation decisions, or audit logging) instead of implementing their own authentication.
**See**: [Developer Guide - Accessing Authenticated User Information](DEVELOPER-GUIDE.md#accessing-authenticated-user-information) for code examples.
---